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THE IMPACT OF HOURS-OF-SERVICE 
REGULATIONS ON TRANSPORTATION 
PRODUCTIVITY AND SAFETY:




Since driver fatigue has known to be the primary cause of serious truck crashes, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (FMCSA) has attempted to implement new hours-of-service (HOS) regulations that aimed to promote 
safer driving environments. The new HOS regulations effective on October T‘ of2005, however, may lead to substantial 
cost increases for the trucking industry which will in turn hurt shippers and ultimately customers. For instance, motor 
carriers may need to hire additional drivers to comply with new HOS regulations requiring that drivers be placed out- 
of-service until they accumulated enough off-duty time. In particular, off-duty breaks required to refresh driving hours 
were increased to 10 consecutive hours from the old rule of eight cumulative hours. A chronic shortage of truck drivers 
coupled with new HOS regulations could further aggravate the driver recruitment and retention problems. In addition, 
due to potential loading/unloading delays and stiffer fines /penalties resulting from new HOS regulations, trucking 
productivity may decline. To help trucking firms cope with various challenges of new HOS regulations, this paper 
provides a systematic overview of prior literature that examines the impact of HOS on transportation productivity and 
safety in the U.S. It also discusses managerial implications of new HOS regulations.
INTRODUCTION
The hours of service (HOS) regulations were first 
introduced by the now-abolished Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) in 1937 as a way to protect the 
safety of long-haul truckers. The HOS’s main purpose 
is to prevent truck accidents caused by driver fatigue. 
This is accomplished by limiting the number of driver 
working hours per day and week. Driver working 
hours include the time spent on loading, unloading, 
driving, handling freight, preparing reports, preparing 
vehicles for service, or performing any other duty 
pertaining to the transportation of passengers or 
property. The main reason for limiting driver working 
hours is to prevent fatigue by keeping drivers on a 21- 
to 24-hour schedule, maintaining a human body’s
natural sleep and wake cycle (so-called circadian 
rhythm). Drivers are required to take a daily 
minimum period of rest and are allowed longer 
weekend rest periods to combat sleep deprivation, 
cumulative fatigue, and time-on-task fatigue effects 
that accrue on a weekly basis (Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration, 2006). Despite their intent to 
enhance traffic safety, HOS regulations have become 
sources of controversy because it is hard for the policy 
maker to determine exactly how long drivers should 
work and sleep for their safety. As such, there were 
numerous proposals to amend HOS regulations 
between 1962 and 2009, but none were ever finalized 
due to contentious debates over their effectiveness in 
enhancing traffic safety.
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One of the most notable proposals of those includes 
the highway reauthorization bill recently passed by 
the U.S. House of Representatives, which contained 
several important amendments for HOS regulations 
that aimed to balance the requirement for highway 
safety and the need for effective trucking services in 
the United States. Amended HOS regulations 
introduced by the U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (FMCSA) in 2003 and 2005 were 
generally well received by drivers, carriers, and 
shippers, although carriers seek more flexible sleeper 
berth rules. The main theme of the 2003 HOS rules is 
to increase an opportunity for restorative sleep by 
increasing the amount of off-duty time by two hours. 
To elaborate, these rules allowed truck drivers to drive 
a maximum of 11 hours after 10 consecutive hours off 
duty. However, truck drivers are prohibited to drive 
beyond the 14th hour after coming off duty, following 
10 consecutive hours of duty. The 2003 HOS rules 
were further refined in 2005 which remained virtually 
unchanged as of 2008, because of a decision by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit in Public Citizen et al. versus 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (374 F.3d 
1209) on July 16, 2005, which stated the 2003 HOS 
rules did not consider the impact of rules on driver 
health (Blanchard, 2004). As summarized in Table 1, 
the 2008 HOS rules intended to increase potential for 
quality sleep by mandating commercial motor vehicle 
(CMV) drivers to take at least 8 consecutive hours in 
the sleeper berth plus two consecutive hours either in 
the sleeper berth, off duty, or any combination of the 
two.
Unfortunately, these amended regulations were still 
attacked by the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters and public safety advocacy groups such as 
Public Citizen, Parents against Tired Truckers 
(PATT), and Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways 
(CRASH) despite the fact that truck crashes and 
driver fatalities have fallen in the recent years even as 
more freight has been moved since their enactment 
(Cutler and Regan, 2007). To elaborate, the 2006 fatal 
crash rate for large trucks stood at 1.93 fatal crashes 
per 100 million vehicle-miles-traveled. This rate broke 
the previous low of 1.97 fatal crashes per 100 million 
vehicle-miles-traveled in 2002. The large truck- 
involvement rate fell to 2.12 per 100 million vehicle 
miles traveled, down from 2.21 a year earlier. The 
fatality rate declined to 2.24 per 100 million vehicle- 
miles-traveled, down from 2.34 in 2005 (Business 
Wire, 2008).
So, the fundamental questions still remain to be 
answered:
(1) Do these amended HOS rules save lives, or do 
they put more lives at risk?
(2) Do these amended HOS rules improve carrier 
operations and subsequently enhance trucking 
productivity or do they put the trucking industry 
in jeopardy and thus increase trucking business 
failures?
Since the major goals of various interest groups are 
varied and often conflicting, the implications of HOS 
regulations have become one of the most controversial 
topics in the United States. Those groups, such as 
shippers, who are in favor of 2008 HOS rules have 
advocated maintaining status quo or getting the 2008 
HOS rules legislated into law, without FMCSA ever 
addressing the above questions. On the other hand, 
those groups, such as public safety advocacy groups, 
who are opposed to the 2008 HOS rules have 
supported enacting stricter controls over the trucking 
industry on the premise that drivers who are allowed 
more than 10 hours a day behind a wheel will get 
fatigued and threaten the safety of the general public 
on the road. Recognizing these contrasting views and 
interpretations of the HOS rules, this paper intends to 
gather factual evidence from the past scientific studies 
regarding the HOS rules and their related issues such 
as human fatigue, circadian rhythms, accident rates, 
fatalities, potential carrier costs, and trucking 
productivity and then validate some of the rationale 
behind arguments made by various interest groups. 
Specifically, the main objectives of this paper are to
1. Synthesize the existing literature dealing with the 
pros and cons of HOS rules with respect to their 
safety and productivity implications;
2. Identify key factors influencing driver fatigue, 
reduced alertness, and driving task performance 
based on the findings of the past studies;
3. Clarify the myth surrounding the correlation 
between HOS rules and transportation safety and 
trucking business failures based on secondary 
data analyses;
4. Recommend best-practices and more productive 
transportation strategies that can minimize driver 
fatigue and improve driver productivity under new 
HOS rules;
5. Discuss the future outlook for extensions of 
existing HOS literature and untapped research 
topics relevant to HOS rules.
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TABLE 1
RECENT CHANGES IN HOURS-OF-SERVICE RULES
May drive a maximum of 11 hours after 10 No Change
consecutive hours off duty.
May not drive beyond the 14th hour after coming off No Change 
duty, following 10 consecutive hours off duty.
May not drive after 60 hours of duty in 7 
consecutive days if the employing motor carrier 
does not operate commercial motor vehicles every 
day of the week.
• A driver may restart a 7 consecutive day period 
after taking 34 or more consecutive hours off 
duty.
May not drive after 70 hours of duty in 8 
consecutive days if the employing motor carrier 
operates commercial motor vehicles every day of 
the week.
• A driver may restart a 8 consecutive day period 
after taking 34 or more consecutive hours off 
duty.
May not drive after the 14tn hour after coming on 
duty 5 days a week or after the 16th hour after 
coming on duty 2 days a week for those drivers who 
operate within a 150-mile radius of their normal 
work reporting location.
Commercial motor vehicle (CMV) drivers using a CMV drivers using the sleeper berth provision must 
sleeper berth must take 10 hours off duty, but may take at least 8 consecutive hours in the sleeper berth, 
split sleeper berth tome into two periods provided plus 2 consecutive hours either in the sleeper berth, off 
neither is less than 2 hours.duty, or any combination of the two,
Note: Passenger-carrying carrier/drivers are not subject to the above rules. These operations must comply with 




KEY HOS PREMISES AND THEIR RATIONALE
The human body typically functions on a 24-hour 
cycle. To elaborate, most people’s biological clocks 
work on a 25-hour cycle rather than a 24-hour cycle. 
However, the human body’s biological cycle normally 
follows the 24-hour cycle of the sun rather than the 
human body’ innate cycle, because sunlight or other 
bright lights can reset a pair of pinhead-sized brain 
structures called suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN) that 
contain about 20,000 neurons (Koukkari and Sothern, 
2006). This biological clock is set based on circadian
rhythms which dictate changes in the human’s mental 
and physical characteristics in the course of a day. 
These changes include: fluctuations in blood pressure, 
heart rate, body temperature, hormones, memory, 
reaction time, and attention span. Thus, circadian 
rhythms influence total sleep hours, rest hours, and 
subsequent restoration power of the human body 
(Liskowsky, 1992).
In particular, the disruption of circadian rhythms 
caused by irregular work patterns and sleep 
deprivation that are common in long-haul truck
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driving can lead to serious driver fatigue and 
performance decrement (Ogilvie and Wilkinson, 1984). 
The cumulative driver fatigue would increase the 
likelihood of the driver’s slow reaction, slow driving, 
disorientation, poor gear change, poor steering, and 
lane deviation and thus increase the risk of truck 
crashes (Office of Technology Assessment, 1991). As a 
matter of fact, a number of studies linked driver 
fatigue to safety. For example, Van Cauter and Turek 
(1990) observed that driver fatigue tended to 
deteriorate driving performance and subsequently 
increased accident rates. Similar conclusions were 
drawn by Sweedler et al. (1990) and Mitler et al. 
(1997) whose studies indicated that fatigue was one of 
the most probable causes of many truck crashes in the 
United States. Indeed, the U.S. National 
Transportation Safety Board (2008) blamed driver 
fatigue as a probable factor in 20-40% of truck crashes. 
That is to say, when truck drivers become fatigued 
from excessive driving/working hours and continuous 
sleep deprivation (e.g., sleep apnoea, insomnia, 
narcolepsy), they significantly increase the risk of 
truck crashes that result in fatalities and serious 
injuries. Considering this serious risk to public safety, 
HOS’s main intent is to provide an increased 
opportunity for truck drivers to obtain necessary rest 
and restorative sleep. This intent of HOS, however, is 
in conflict with the goal of many truck drivers whose 
earnings depend heavily on the number of their 
driving hours. The U.S. National Transportation 
Safety Board (2008) estimated that the average 
trucker drove 125,000 miles a year, and that was on 
the low end of an average. The question remains how 
one can compromise the number of driving hours 
sufficient enough for truckers to make their ends 
meet, while not too long for them to lose their 
circadian rhythms and necessary daily sleeps.
An answer to the above question hinges on the 
threshold of sleep deprivation that can adversely 
affect driving performance and begin to pose a serious 
danger to both truck drivers and others on the road. 
One of the clues can be found in several recent studies 
that examined the impact of partial and full sleep 
deprivation on driving impairment such as lane 
keeping performances. These studies include 
Fairclough and Graham (1999) who discovered that 
the effect of one night sleep deprivation was 
equivalent to that of 0.07% blood alcohol content 
(BAC). Similarly, Arnedt et al. (2001) found that the 
impact of 21 hours of driving without any sleep on 
driving performance was equivalent to that of 0.08% 
of BAC. Driving with such a level of BAC is illegal in 
most of the U.S. since that level of BAC would 
increase the risk of fatal vehicle crashes by three to 17
times more (Heng et al., 2006). Amundsen and 
Sagberg (2003) also discovered that even a small 
reduction in sleep (e.g., restricting sleep less than 
seven hours) could triple the accident risk. 
Considering such risk, 2003 HOS aimed to move 
towards a 24-hour work-rest cycle, enhance the 
opportunity for restorative sleep by increasing the 
amount of off-duty time by two hours, and strike a 
balance between uniform, consistent enforcement, and 
operational flexibility. As shown in Table 2, Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) under 
the U.S. Department of Transportation (2003) 
estimated that 2003 HOS would save up to 75 lives 
and prevent as many as 1,326 fatigue-related crashes 
annually (http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/about/news/news- 
releases/2003/052703.asp).
Taking a step further, new 2008 HOS rules effective 
on January 19th of 2009 require 10 consecutive hours 
of off-duty time to increase the potential for quality 
sleep. However, the new HOS rules may lead to 
substantial cost increases for the trucking industry 
which will in turn hurt shippers and ultimately 
customers. For instance, the trucking industry may 
need to hire additional 84.000 drivers to comply with 
the new HOS rules requiring that drivers be placed 
out-of-service until they accumulated enough off-duty 
time. In particular, off-duty breaks required to refresh 
driving hours were increased to 10 consecutive hours 
from the old rule of eight consecutive hours. A chronic 
shortage of truck drivers coupled with the new HOS 
rules could further aggravate the driver recruitment 
and retention problem. In addition, due to potential 
loading/unloading delays and stiffer fines/penalties 
(between $550 and $11,000 per violation depending on 
the severity) imposed by the new HOS rules, motor 
carriers such as Schneider National estimated that 
trucking productivity would decline by 4-19% (WERC, 
2004). Similarly, the new HOS rules stipulated that 
drivers would be considered on duty when loading and 
unloading or waiting to clear customary paperwork. 
For this reason, most observers anticipate significant 
productivity losses--in some cases approaching 20%-- 
particularly for truckload carriers. As such, Wal-Mart 
expected the new HOS rules to add $25 million to the 
cost of new drivers and tractors alone (Clair and Fox, 
2004). Furthermore, a HOS compliance cost can add a 
significant burden to the trucking industry. For 
example, the purchase and installation of an electronic 
on-board recorder (EOBR) could cost the trucker more 
than $2,000. Its annual operating and maintenance 
cost of $200 should be factored into the cost estimate 
as well. Also, drivers averaged 20 minutes of time to 
write logs for each trip and fleet managers typically 
spent 20 minutes a month to review and monitor
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TABLE 2
TRAFFIC SAFETY RECORD AND HOS EFFECTS FOR LARGE TRUCKS (GROSS VEHICLE 
WEIGHT RATING EXCEEDING 10,000 POUNDS)
2001-2003 total number of large truck involved in crashes
2001-2003 total number of large truck involved in fatigue-related 
crashes




1997-2000 average injuries in fatigue-related crashes 7,500 people
1997-1999 average cost per truck crash 
2002 total cost of fatigue-related crashes
Lives that could have been saved in 2002 by 100% HOS compliance 
Estimated annual cost savings to motor carriers by 100% HOS 
compliance
Net benefits of HOS rules
$62,613
$2.3 billion
75 to 120 people
$900 million to $1.3 billion
$600 million to $1.1 billion per 
year
Source: FMCSA (2005), Commercial Motor Vehicle Facts, http://www.truckbrakesafety.com/pdf7articles/fmcsa- 
facts-figures.pdf; FMCSA (2008), The Large Truck Crash Causation Study, http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts- 
research/research-technology/analysis/FMCSA-RRA-07-017.htm.
driver compliances; thus, HOS compliance efforts 
would be detrimental to trucking productivity (Barnes, 
2000). Complicating the HOS compliance efforts, new 
HOS rules can be interpreted in many different ways 
since FMCSA officials have no plans to issue a 
clarification to the rules (Adams, 2005). For example, 
the rules do not regulate how off duty hours must be 
used, how a mandatory two rest-break should be 
utilized, and what the parameters of a continuous 14 
shift should be. Thus, many drivers may end up taking 
odd nap times, trying to travel hundreds of miles 
without a proper rest-break, and feeling the increased 
pressure of meeting delivery times.
THE DRIVER FATIGUE MODEL
As discussed earlier, the leading cause of truck 
accidents is driver fatigue. In fact, driver fatigue was 
the primary cause of 2% to 23% of all truck crashes 
(O’Hanlon 1978, Horne and Reyner, 1995). Reissmann 
(1997) also discovered that drowsy drivers were 
responsible for 50% of the fatal vehicle crashes on the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike and New York Thruway. In 
particular, driver fatigue is overrepresented in
accidents during nighttime, single-vehicle accidents, 
high-speed (especially more than 90 miles) accidents, 
and accidents on monotonous roads (Sagberg, 1999; 
Amundsen and Sagberg, 2003). A recent study 
conducted by the Adelaide Centre for Sleep Research 
showed that drivers who have been awake for 24 
hours have an equivalent driving performance to a 
person who has a BAC (blood alcohol content) of 0.1 




The typical symptoms of driver fatigue include groggy 
and exhaustive feeling, frequent yawning, strained 
eyes, daydreaming while on the road, driving right of 
center, driving with varying speed, and experiencing 
short bursts of microsleep (i.e., a lapse from wake to 
sleep that lasts only a few seconds). One of the ironies 
of driver fatigue is that the driver may be too tired to 
determine his/her own level of fatigue 
(http://www.sleep-deprivation.com/articles/causes-of- 
sleep-deprivation/driver-fatigue.php, 2008). Since 
driver fatigue reduces driver alertness and adversely
Fall 2009 53
affects driver performance, it has been the central 
theme of the various HOS rules. Thus, it is important 
for us to understand what causes driver fatigue and 
how significantly driver fatigue influences truck 
safety. To increase such understanding, we developed 
a driver fatigue model based on the findings of prior 
studies and theory postulated by human biology and 
behavioral science.
Factors Influencing Driver Fatigue
Driver fatigue is affected by a multitude of factors 
encompassing human biology (e.g., circadian 
rhythms), working environments (e.g., time on the 
road), working schedules (e.g., trip schedules), and 
work demand (e.g., breaks). Among those factors, a 
circadian rhythm is generally known to be one of the 
most important factors contributing to driver fatigue 
since it directly affects a driver’s psychological 
processes and mental functions such as memory, 
reaction time, manual dexterity, and feel of alertness 
that, in turn, influence driver performance (Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1991; Dawson et al., 2001; 
Fletcher and Dawson, 2001). Figure 1 shows how- 
driver fatigue can increase the risk of truck crashes. 
To complicate the driver fatigue model, the circadian 
rhythm is intertwined with a driver’s individual 
characteristics (e.g., age, fitness, driving experience, 
sleep disorders, medical conditions), monotonous 
working environments creating boredom (e.g., straight 
driving with a lack of stimulation), and work 
schedules (e.g., nighttime driving, long working hours, 
cumulative sleep debt, irregular rest periods) (Brown, 
1993; Crum et ah, 2001; Eskandarian, 2007). Figure 2 
displays the correlation between these attributes and 
driver fatigue. In the next sub-sections, we will 
elaborate on the effect of some of these factors on 
driver performance and subsequent truck safety.
Driver age. It is a common perception that younger 
drivers are likely to get involved in accidents due to 
their lack of driving experience and recklessness. 
Thus, a combination of driver fatigue and youth can be 
a deadly mix for potential vehicle crashes. Regardless, 
the findings of prior studies examining the link 
between driver age and fatigue are not conclusive. For 
example, although there were large differences among 
drivers in levels of alertness and performance, a driver 
fatigue and alertness study conducted by FMCSA 
(1997) showed no significant relationships between 
driver age and fatigue. On the other hand, Horne et ah 
(2002) indicated that younger drivers had a somewhat 
higher risk of being involved in fatigue-related 
accidents than older drivers. This finding is somewhat 
contrary to an observation made by Reissman (1997)
that younger drivers often have greater flexibility 
adjusting to new sleep patterns than older drivers do. 
Also, Campagne et ah (2004) compared the 
performance of three age groups in a driving simulator 
study and found that deterioration of vigilance was 
correlated with driving errors for drivers aged 60 and 
above.
Another study conducted by Summala and Mikkola 
(1994) showed that record road accidents among 18-20 
old drivers peaked during midnight to 6a.m., whereas 
the accidents caused by drivers over 50 years old 
peaked during the late afternoon hours. More recently, 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (2008) discovered 
that fatigued drivers under 29 years of age had a 
higher risk of vehicle crashes than those over 50 years 
old. It also showed a significant relationship between 
the age of the fatigued driver and the type of fatigue- 
related crash (single vehicle or head-on). Single 
vehicle crashes involved a higher proportion of 
fatigued drivers under 29 years of age compared with 
head-on crashes. However, fatigued drivers over 50 
years of age were involved in more head-on crashes. 
This relationship might be linked to the time of crash. 
That is to say, single vehicle crashes are more likely to 
occur in the early morning and early morning crashes 
are more likely to involve fatigued drivers under 29 
years of age. A similar logic could explain the 
relationship between older fatigued drivers and head- 
on crashes. Therefore, age can be a mediating factor 
for accidental risk. However, its importance to driver 
fatigue is unclear.
Obesity. Stoohs et al. (1994) found that obese truck 
drivers had a two-fold higher accident rate per mile 
than non-obese drivers. Similarly, a recent 15-month 
empirical study conducted by Park et al. (2009) 
subjected 456 commercial truck drivers to screenings 
for an obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) which disrupts 
sleep and results in daytime sleepiness, sleep attacks 
or “nodding off”, impaired psychomotor ability, and 
poor decision-making ability. The study reported that 
approximately 2.4 - 3.9 million licensed commercial 
drivers in the U.S. might suffer from OSA due to their 
obesity, which would likely cause them to fall asleep at 
the wheel more frequently than physically-fitting 
drivers and thus increase accident risks.
Long driving hours. Long-haul drivers represent 
about half of the registered truck fleet in the U.S., but 
were involved in more than 90% of fatal truck crashes 
(FMCSA, 2003). This may be due to the fact that long 
haul (i.e., trips of 100 miles or more from the driver’s 
home base) requires longer driving hours and thus 
increases the risk of vehicle crashes. Indeed, the 
relative risk of truck drivers who have driven more 
than eight hours was almost twice as high as those 
who drove lesser hours (Kaneko and Jovanis, 1990;
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FIGURE 1
THE DRIVER FATIGUE INFLUENCE DIAGRAM
FIGURE 2
FACTORS INFLUENCING DRIVER FATIGUE
Adapted and modified from Dawson, D., Feyer, A.M., Grander, P., Hartley, L., Haworth, N., and
Source:
Williamson, A. (2001), Fatigue Expert Group: Options for Regulatory Approach to Fatigue in Drivers 
of Heavy Vehicles in Australia and New Zealand, Unpublished Discussion Paper, Melbourne, 
Australia: Australian Transportation Safety Board.
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Braver et al., 1999; Heaton, 2005). Similarly, 
Mukherjee et al. (2006) discovered that a restriction 
on trips of no more than eight hours would reduce 
truck fatalities by 3-5% as compared to no such 
restriction.
Flexible driver schedules. Mackie and Miller (1978) 
observed that driving performance among truck 
drivers started declining after 5 hours of driving for 
drivers with irregular schedules as compared to 8 
hours for drivers with regular schedules. As such, 
driver schedules can influence driver performance and 
the subsequent risk of truck crashes. Considering the 
impact of driver schedules on driver safety, a growing 
number of trucking firms have considered driver- 
friendly schedules, such as flexible schedules. For 
instance, flexible driver schedules resulting from the 
24-hour restart provision often allow drivers to 
maintain a more routine (so-called rhythmic) driving 
schedule because they prevent the drivers from 
driving at odd hours and decrease off-duty time 
driving. As a result, a majority of drivers believed that 
such schedules would help them spend more time at 
home, increase their income, and thus improve their 
safety (Griffin et al., 1992).
Driver income. Truck drivers earn relatively low 
hourly wages as compared to most other comparable 
jobs (Belzer et al., 2002). To make matters worse, 
many drivers (especially non-union drivers) typically 
get paid only by the mile with no separate pay for non­
driving work, such as their waiting and loading/ 
unloading time at the dock. Under the current HOS 
rules, the opportunity cost of non-driving work can be 
too high for many drivers. This peculiar situation will 
force some drivers to violate the HOS rules and drive 
longer hours without sufficient breaks to make their 
ends meet and increase the risk of truck crashes. 
Indeed, the violations of HOS rules are on the steady 
rise. For example, 3.8% of the road-check inspection of 
motor carriers resulted in out-of-service conditions for 
HOS violations in 2005 that was slightly up from 
3.44% in 2004 (Logistics Today, 2005). Braver et al. 
(1992) found that truck drivers who violated the HOS 
rules are more likely to fall asleep at the wheel and 
thus increase the risk of truck crashes. Thus, 
inadequate driver compensation may have a harmful 
effect on driver safety. Some studies such as Griffin et 
al. (1992) suggested that for every one cent increase in 
driver pay, there would be an 11.1% decrease in truck 
crash probability.
Monotonous driving. Due to a lack of stimuli, the 
monotony of road conditions can increase driver 
boredom and decrease driver performance. For
example, driving performance degrades at a faster 
rate on straight road sections than on curves 
(Desmond and Mathews, 1998). In particular, sleep 
related accidents may be more common on long 
stretches of interstate highways and may account for 
40% of fatal accidents (Shafer, 1993; McCartt et al., 
1996). Likewise, driver fatigue is likely to occur much 
earlier when driving on straight, rural roads (Fell, 
1994; Thiffault and Bergeron, 2003).
Vehicle speed. Since vehicle speed can either shorten 
or lengthen the truck driver’s driving hours, potential 
traffic congestion and road construction along the 
driver’s designated route can influence driver fatigue 
and the subsequent driver safety. Considering the 
potential link between vehicle speed and driver safety, 
both Malandraki and Daskin (1992) and Donati et al. 
(2006) developed a step function with consecutive time 
intervals that took into account changes in vehicle 
speed due to traffic congestions and unexpected delays 
on the road. Their studies revealed interdependence 
between vehicle speed and driver schedules/truck 
routes that, in turn, influence driver fatigue.
Preventive Measures for Driver Fatigue and 
Truck Crashes
As summarized in Table 2, driver fatigue can result in 
truck crashes and the subsequent fatalities, injuries, 
and property damages, and thereby burden motor 
carriers with a substantial amount of financial losses 
and decreased productivity. In the era of intensified 
competition in the trucking industry, motor carriers 
should develop viable guidelines to alleviate driver 
fatigue and then prevent the potential truck 
accidents/crashes, while complying with the HOS 
rules. With that in mind, we propose the following 
“best-practice” guidelines:
• Crum and Morrow (2002) found that starting the 
work week tired was the single most important 
factor influencing truck driver fatigue. To ensure 
adequate rest before the beginning of the work 
week, trucking firms should discourage long-haul 
drivers to follow disjoint sleep patterns and 
encourages them to have at least five hours of 
uninterrupted sleep by developing driver 
routes/schedules (especially post-trip) that allow 
frequent stops at home;
• To make the effective use of a driver’s time to get 
adequate rest, trucking firms should minimize or 
eliminate the time a driver spends to count, load, 
and complete the paperwork, while minimizing the 
assistance of unnecessary lumpers who may prolong
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the unloading time. Also, it is known that drivers 
tended to be more awake after lumping in the 
morning, but grew tired after lumping in the 
afternoon (Barnes, 2000). In other words, trucking 
firms need to find “driver-friendly” freight (e.g., 
automotive parts, grocery/food items, paper 
delivery) whenever possible;
To minimize waiting/idle time at the unloading dock 
that takes away a driver’s rest time and earning 
opportunities, trucking firms should consider using 
“drop-and-hook” options more frequently. In a 
typical drop-and-hook operation, the driver drops off 
a fully loaded trailer in the warehouse/distribution 
center yard and then hauls away an empty one 
without waiting for unloading. Thus, it saves the 
driver’s waiting time. Also, this practice reduces 
fuel costs and carbon footprints since it eliminates 
the need for the truck to sit in the warehouse yard 
with its engine idling;
To prolong the quality rest break, trucking firms 
should direct and encourage truck drivers to full- 
service rest stops where they can combine non­
driving activities such as meal stops, stretches, 
refueling, shower, laundry, and social hours with 
the other drivers. Given the nationwide shortages of 
rest areas, the use of global positioning systems 
(GPS) along with satellite communication systems 
to locate nearest rest areas may be essential. Also, 
truck routes/delivery schedules should be 
restructured in such a way that drivers can have a 
greater access to these rest areas;
According to Braver et al. (1992), the main reason 
why drivers violated the HOS rules are irregular 
route driving, penalty for late arrivals, carrying 
perishable goods, and being assigned unrealistic 
delivery deadlines. To minimize instances of HOS 
violations by truck drivers, trucking firms should 
negotiate with their shippers to allow the drivers to 
arrive at any time up to a certain time and day with 
open (soft) time windows as opposed to strict (fixed- 
schedule) delivery deadlines (Nixon, 2005). Also, the 
increased use of relay and team driving may help 
reduce the adverse impact of irregular route driving 
on the drivers;
If the truck breaks down in the middle of the road, 
its driver would waste his/her valuable time for 
adequate rest and force the driver to catch up with 
his/her lost time by driving faster. Thus, thorough
pre-trip inspection and preventive maintenance of 
the truck will help drivers make better use of their 
on-the-road off-duty time and subsequently reduce 
the potential risk of fatigue-related truck crashes.
The recent study conducted by NAVTEQ indicated 
that the use of a real-time navigation system which 
could alert drivers about unexpected traffic delays and 
ongoing road construction activities would help drivers 
save 18% of driving time on an average trip and 
increase fuel efficiency (Industry News, 2009). 
Considering this benefit, long-haul drivers may take 
advantage of this kind of device to better utilize their 
driving hours and thus increase non-driving 
restorative periods.
MYTHS ABOUT HOS IMPACTS USING 
SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS
As discussed earlier, there were conflicting reports 
regarding the impact of HOS amendments on traffic 
safety in terms of reduced truck crashes. To further 
investigate the validity of this impact, we summarized 
the secondary data available from the U.S. 
Department of Transportation. As shown in Table 3, 
truck crashes declined a year after 2000, 2003 and 
2005 HOS amendments despite steady increases in 
the number of vehicle miles, whereas those figures 
increased a year after 1996 HOS amendment. 
However, truck crashes seem to climb back gradually 
two year after each HOS amendment. As a matter of 
fact, the Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed that there 
was no statistically significant difference (p-value = 
0.144) in truck crash statistics between four years 
before and after 2003 HOS amendment. Thus, it is 
difficult to make any concrete conclusions about the 
impact of HOS on traffic safety. To settle controversies 
surrounding the impact of HOS on the trucking 
industry, we looked at trucking business failures as a 
surrogate measure of the financial health of the 
trucking industry. As displayed in Figure 3, although 
there is a surge in trucking business failures in the 
third quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2001, 
past patterns of the trucking business failures tend to 
be cyclical and thus have little to do with any 
particular government mandates or rules. Instead, 
increases in trucking business failures seemed to be 
more correlated with economic downturns than any 
particular government policies or rules such as HOS 
amendments. For example, dramatic increases in 
trucking business failures in 2001 and 2007 coincided 
with recessionary economies during those years.
Fall 2009 57
TABLE 3
CRASH RECORD FOR LARGE TRUCKS (GROSS VEHICLE WEIGHT RATING EXCEEDING 
10,000 POUNDS) DURING THE PERIOD OF 1990 THROUGH 2007
Year Recession vear? Trucks involved in crashes in total Vehicle miles in millions
1990 Yes 384,776 146,242
1991 No 330,347 149,543
1992 No 376,035 153,384
1993 No 397,328 159,888
1994 No 460.644 170,216






1998 No 411,955 196,380
1999 No 474,920 202.688
2000 No 456.955 205.520
2001 Yes 429,823 209,032
2002 No 434,587 214,603
2003 No 456.721 217.917
2004 No 415,902 220,792
2005 No 440.951 222,523
2006 No 384,766 222,513
2007 Yes 413,584 226,963
Aver 411,459 (39.461) 172,711 (84,076)
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations.
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, National Center 
for Statistics and Analysis, Traffic Safety Facts 2007, Final Edition (Washington, DC), available at 
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/ as of March 2009.
FIGURE 3
TRUCKING BUSINESS FAILURES DURING THE PERIOD OF 1990 THROUGH 2008
Total Trucking Business Failures 
(Companies with 5 or more Trucks) 
(Q1 1990- Q3 2008)
Source: Avondale Partners, LLC, American Trucking Association (2008)
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CONCLUSIONS AND 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Since the inception of HOS regulations in 1939, these 
regulations have been controversial. Even the series of 
their amendments in 1962,1996, 2000, 2003, and 2005 
have failed to stop controversies and silence critics. 
The center of the controversies often lies in the 
misinterpretation and misunderstanding of their 
impact on reduction in driver fatigue and increase in 
driver safety/productivity. To compound the moot 
point surrounding HOS regulations, some study 
findings regarding the impact of HOS rules on driver 
safety are incongruent and inconsistent with each 
other. Thus, there is a great need for us to synthesize 
these study findings and discern real facts from 
misconceptions. With that in mind, this paper 
thoroughly reviewed various forms of prior studies 
including empirical, exploratory, case, and analytical 
studies that investigated the various effects of HOS 
rules on driver fatigue and safety, while analyzing 
secondary data sources available from the public 
domain. Based on the review of prior literature and 
secondary data sources, we can draw the following 
conclusions:
• The disruption of a truck driver’s circadian rhythms 
resulting from irregular work or rest patterns is one 
of the most important reasons for driver fatigue. As 
driver fatigue increases, driver safety decreases due 
to a lack of reaction time, dexterity, memory, 
cognition, and feeling of alertness associated with 
driver fatigue. Thus, a series of HOS rules 
introduced in the past aimed to reduce driver 
fatigue by not only limiting the truck driver’s duty 
hours, but also increasing off-duty rest periods. 
Despite this intention, HOS rules have become a 
constant source of controversies due to their 
oversight of long haul trucking practices. By nature, 
long haul trucking is characterized by extended and 
irregular duty hours that are often affected by many 
interwoven factors such as delivery schedules 
(including restricted time windows, nighttime 
driving), geographical customer bases, truck routes, 
driver shifts, driver earning opportunities, driver 
ldle/waiting time at the loading/unloading docks, 
and number of different time zones that drivers 
need to pass. Thus, the effectiveness of HOS rules 
should be assessed holistically rather than being 
judged by their influence on each factor. •
• For a variety of reasons including the carrier’s 
delivery service commitments and the driver’s 
concerns over his/her income, many drivers across 
the U.S. and Canada seemed to knowingly violate
the HOS rules. Although electronic monitoring 
(through on-board recorders) of driver logs is 
available, its reliability is still questionable and the 
strict enforcement of the HOS rules on violators 
would significantly increase compliance costs for 
both carriers and federal agencies such as FMCSA. 
Thus, the FMCSA may need to ease the driver’s 
burden of writing logs and reduce the dispatch 
manager’s time to review and administer driver 
compliance regulations by reducing the frequency of 
writing logs and reviewing records.
• In addition to driver fatigue, truck driving 
environments such as the number of rest stops, 
dedicated parking areas, and road conditions (e.g., 
straight rural roads) are attributed to driver safety. 
Since the improvements of these environments 
require the state/federal governments’ extensive 
time and monetary investments in transportation 
infrastructure, these environments are considered 
“given.” Thus, dispatchers should be aware of these 
environments and restructure truck routes that can 
be adapted to these environments.
• It is inconclusive that HOS amendments drastically 
reduced traffic safety. Likewise, it is difficult for us 
to pinpoint the adverse economic impact of HOS 
amendments on the trucking industry from the 
macro-economic standpoint, although HOS 
compliances and enforcements will be costly.
As summarized above, various studies have been 
conducted to identify the sources of driver fatigues and 
their impact on trucking safety. However, there is still 
void left to fill in the literature to assess the 
effectiveness of HOS rules holistically. To point the 
right direction for future research endeavors, we 
suggest the following selected line of research topic 
areas that can help trucking firms improve 
transportation strategies in accordance with new HOS 
rules.
• Develop the best combination of duty and off-duty 
periods that add up to normal 24-hour circadian 
rhythms by simulating various combinations of duty 
and off-duty periods;
• Estimate the minimum recuperation time needed to 
compensate for interrupted sleep time by comparing 
various combinations of flexible driving schedules 
(e.g., shorter away from home versus longer at- 
home periods, Monday driving after home rests 
versus Friday driving after long driving on the 
road);
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Examine the effects of nighttime driving between 
midnight and 6:00 a.m. on driver safety with 
required off-duty periods that enable restorative 
sleep for drivers involving such nighttime driving 
versus without those required off-duty periods;
Assess the impact of lumper hiring on the driver’s 
productivity and fatigue;
Determine the adequacy of sleep obtained in cab 
sleep-berth in comparison to sleep at the full service 
rest areas;
Identify warning signals for potential truck 
accidents such as the driver’s eye movement, eye-lid 
droop, and lane violations and then develop 
strategies/devices to monitor such signals;
Develop profiles (e.g., age, gender, experience, 
physical fit) of truck drivers who are more prone to
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